Reading Analysis – Youth and Society – Individualized Society

An analysis of the quotation:

‘In the individualized society the individual must therefore learn, on pain of permanent disadvantage, to conceive of himself or herself as the center of action, as the planning office with respect to his/her own biography, abilities, orientations, relationships and so on.’ (Beck, 1992: 135, cited in Thomson 2007: 79)

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Plays, Books, Movies and Music; through narratives and lyrics, these various forms of media have often shown how the human psyche has had a desire to control its own destiny.  Ulrich Beck claims that this is no longer in the realm of fiction, but is becoming an increasingly necessary part of everyday life.

‘In the individualized society the individual must therefore learn, on pain of permanent disadvantage, to conceive of himself or herself as the center of action, as the planning office with respect to his/her own biography, abilities, orientations, relationships and so on.’ (Beck, 1992, p. 135, cited in Thomson 2007, p. 79)

It is widely acknowledged that ‘western’ society is changing.  We are living in an increasingly ‘individualised’ society, where choices are forced upon us, and we need ‘to make an active effort […] day after day’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002, p. 3), or we ‘face the consequences of failing to do so’ (Thomson 2007, p. 79).  These forced decisions that once could be left to chance, have passed; we are now required to make the choice and accept the consequences.

Becks’ quotation suggests that in our current and future societies, in order to reduce the ‘risk’ of being disadvantaged by the situation we find ourselves in, we need to take action to create and manage all elements of ourselves, and our relationships.  We must also be willing to do this not only once, but on an ongoing basis.  Glasencnik (2011) followed this unknown imperative.  At various points in her narrative, it is shown how she took up this challenge to direct her path, and avoid being disadvantaged by her situation.  She actively constructed her biography, and ‘the bonds and networks surrounding it’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002, p. 4).

Thomson (2007) finds these concepts useful to assist with describing changes in youth transitions, as well as an overall ‘biographical approach’, though limits its applicability to Youth.  She tells us of two ‘main criticisms’ (p. 89); that of ‘generalisation’ and an overemphasis on change.  She states that generalisation is a common criticism of social theories, and doesn’t place emphasis on this claim, however Skeggs (2002) claims that this theory, along with several others, only acknowledge a ‘white, middle class and western’ group.  Beck & Beck-Gernsheim counter this with research suggesting a ‘much greater degree of mobility in and out of poverty amongst a wide range of people and at different periods of people’s lives’ (2002, p. 207).

Thomson also suggests Beck places too much emphasis on change, as opposed to continuity – how we are tied to the past, our families, etc.  Beck & Beck-Gernsheim counter-claim that current theories overemphasise continuity, and that ‘belonging’, especially to family, is becoming ‘elective’ in nature (2002, p. 85-86).  Nilan (2007) and Atkinson (2007) criticise Beck for overplaying agency, and underplaying structure. Woodman (2009, p. 244-246) identifies several other criticisms by various researchers; however he considers many are based on a ‘misrepresentation’ of Beck, and that many are using his theories as a ‘foil […] constructed to be demolished’(p. 246), and as a way to create and fill an empty middle ground between structure and agency (p. 246).  Beck & Beck-Gernsheim inform us that they do not claim that individualisation is experienced by all societies equally (2002, p. 5; Thomson 2007, p. 90), but consider that it ‘should be seen as designating a trend’.

In our changing society, we are being faced with new challenges, across generations and social classes.  The structure and largely typical linear biography of the past is fading; new forms of society structures and changes in transitions are becoming the norm.  A line from Terminator 2 says it all: The future is not set. There’s no fate but what we make for ourselves.

Word Count: 572
Bibliography

Atkinson, Will 2007, ‘Beck, individualization and the death of class: a critique’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58, Iss. 3, p. 349 – 366.

Beck, Ulrich, Beck-Gernsheim, Elizabeth 2002, ‘Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences’ SAGE Publications, London.

Beck, Ulrich 2007, ‘Beyond class and Nation: reframing social inequalities in a globalising world’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58, Iss. 4, p. 679-705.

Terminator 2: Judgement Day 1991, Feature film, Tri-Star Pictures, California.

de Beer, Paul 2007, ‘How individualised are the Dutch?’ Current Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 3, 389-413.

Dwyer, Peter, Wyn Johanna 2001, ‘Youth, Education and Risk: Facing the Future’, RoutledgeFalmer, London.

Furlong, Andy 2009, ‘Handbook of Youth & Young Adulthood: New Perspectives & Agendas’, Routledge, London.

Glasencnik, Rebecca 2011, ‘My Path to University’, YouTube ™, Digital Narrative. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFCXpGgg4ZI&hd=1

Henderson, Sheila, Holland, Janet, McGrellis, Sheena, Sharpe, Sue, & Thomson, Rachel 2007, ‘Inventing adulthoods: a biographical approach to youth transitions’, SAGE Publications, London.

Jureidini, Ray & Poole, Marilyn (eds) 2003, ‘Sociology: Australian connections’, (3rd ed.) Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, Australia.

Nilan, Pam, Julian, Roberta & Germov, John 2007, ‘Australian youth : social and cultural issues’, Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.

Scott, John 2006, ‘Fifty Key Sociologists, the Contemporary Theorists’ Routledge, London.

SGY130 2010, ‘Youth & Society Study Guide’, Griffith University, Brisbane.

Skeggs, Beverley 2002, ‘Techniques for telling the reflexive self’ in T. May (ed.) ‘Qualitative Research in Action’, SAGE, London.

Thomson, Rachel 2007, ‘A biographical perspective’, in M Kehily (ed), ‘Understanding Youth: Perspectives, identities and practices’, SAGE, London.

Woodman, Dan 2009, ‘The mysterious case of the pervasive choice biography: Ulrich Beck, structure/agency, and the middling state of theory in the sociology of youth’, Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 12, Iss. 3.

Short Essay: The Australian Liberal Party: liberal, or conservative?

In John Howards’ description, the modern Australian Liberal Party is ‘[u]nique’ (1999), in that they are both liberal and conservative.  Whilst seemingly a contradiction in terms, there really is no misnomer; the name comes from ‘classic liberalism’ (Heywood, 2003), whereby their priorities are specifically catered toward ‘negative freedoms’ (Heywood, 2003), notable for the absence of restrictions.  While there are sometimes tensions between their classical liberal outlook and their social conservative side, this is not uncommon in any other political ideology.

The conservative liberalism of the Liberal Party can be identified in their official political philosophy.  Annotated here is a discussion of their philosophy based this promulgated list.  ‘We Believe…’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2011).

• In the inalienable rights and freedoms of all peoples; and we work towards a lean government that minimises interference in our daily lives; and maximises individual and private sector initiative
• In government that nurtures and encourages its citizens through incentive, rather than putting limits on people through the punishing disincentives of burdensome taxes and the stifling structures of Labor’s corporate state and bureaucratic red tape.
• In those most basic freedoms of parliamentary democracy – the freedom of thought, worship, speech and association.

These points highlight their classical liberal philosophy, with the emphasis on individualism, toleration and the minimal role of government.  It promotes the individuals’ ability to forge their own links with community on a volunteer basis, and provides for a meritocratic society where the best and brightest rise to the top.  Through rationalisation, their commitment to low taxation also shows a commitment to minimal welfare, since they consider that a meritocratic society ensures that inequality must be due to personal failure.

• In a just and humane society in which the importance of the family and the role of law and justice is maintained.
• In equal opportunity for all Australians; and the encouragement and facilitation of wealth so that all may enjoy the highest possible standards of living, health, education and social justice.

This is both conservative and liberalism; classical liberal ideals of ‘formal’ justice (Heywood, 2003) in that all have rights, but similar responsibilities.  The Liberal Party is saying here that they don’t agree with ‘special treatment’ of individuals or groups, since all are equal, with equal opportunity to make their own way.  An area of contention is the conservative aspect, in that that the private institution of the family takes precedence.  This aspect of the party faces a measure of contradiction with the liberal ideal of tolerance of diversity.

• That, wherever possible, government should not compete with an efficient private sector; and that businesses and individuals – not government – are the true creators of wealth and employment.

This is evidence of their economic liberalisation – their belief in small government, minimal regulation, and free enterprise.  They expect markets to provide the best outcomes, since it is only by ‘for profit’ enterprises that have an incentive to create what society needs and wants.

• In preserving Australia’s natural beauty and the environment for future generations.

While this may appear as detraction from the Liberal Party philosophy, towards the ‘Green’ movement, this can actually be looked at from both a liberal and conservative viewpoint.  Liberal, in the ‘freedom of the individual’ to participate as they see fit, on the principle of no harm, applying Mills libertarian principle to the environment, as opposed to other members of society.  A conservative aspect in this philosophy is their underlying value for tradition.

• That our nation has a constructive role to play in maintaining world peace and democracy through alliance with other free nations.

Finally, this position takes a liberal approach, toward recognition of the equality of all (hu)mankind, tolerance of diversity, and the movement toward economic liberalism.

Through examination of their philosophy, the misnomer of ‘Liberal’ is removed.

 

Bibliography

Heywood, A. (2003) Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 3rd ed., New York:Palgrave Macmillan.

Howard, J. (1999) ‘CLOSING ADDRESS, THE LIBERAL PARTY’S 47TH FEDERAL COUNCIL’, HYATT HOTEL, CANBERRA.

Liberal Party of Australia (2011) ‘We Believe… ‘, The Party: Our Beliefs [online], available: http://www.liberal.org.au/The-Party/Our-Beliefs.aspx

Short Essay: Costs, Benefits and the unequal distributions of Economic Rationalism

When first used, the idea of ‘Economic Rationalism’ implied governments maximising efficiency through rational economic decision making (Quiggins, 1997).  It would be difficult to claim the majority of Australians do not want efficient and rational government policies, especially in fiscal matters.  So why has ‘Economic Rationalism’ become a pejorative term?  Over several decades since its first use, the etymology has changed, becoming synonymous with neoliberalism, and the unfettered free market.  To some, this has not just altered our economy, but has fundamentally changed our society.

To clarify, economic rationalism is the policy where ‘the primary role of government should be to maximise economic efficiency’ (Wright, 2002).  Utilising basic economic theory, this means that the economy must move as close as possible towards the ‘free market’, through the removal of most, if not all regulation, and the removal of ‘public goods’.  This was a key policy feature of the 1980s, with policies to privatise and deregulate sectors of the economy.  Over successive governments, both Labor and Liberal, this ‘neo-liberal’ trend has continued.  It is also noted that economic theory has become a pervasive ideology dominating nearly every sphere of public life (Richardson, 1997).

This ‘Economic rationalism’ has had some benefits, which are predominantly based around efficiency and access.  These benefits have mainly been realised by those in the higher income brackets.  Consumers now have increased access to a wide range of imports, and this subsequent competition drove prices down (Kenyon, 2000, Moore, 2001).  The banks also began to provide ‘largely non-discriminatory access to cheaper credit’ (Kenyon, 2000).  Moore (2001) posits that this rationalisation promoted efficiency that resulted in productivity gains, and ultimately to increases in incomes since the early 1990s; he also claims that the unemployment rate fell.  Supporters of economic rationalism also claim that the increases in these incomes were ‘equally’ shared, since the ‘progressive income tax’ system allowed ‘generous social welfare benefits’ to be provided, which means there was no increase in the inequality of total incomes (Moore, 2001).

However, there are those that disagree with the neo-liberal view, including other economists.  These disagreements usually fall into either an economic argument, in that there is scepticism over the possibility for coming close to the ideal market, or a normative argument, in that they disagree that the maximisation of efficiency is not the primary role of government (Wright, 2002).

The economic objections to the ‘ideal’ market are based around the requirements for the perfect market; no ‘monopolies or oligopolies’, an ‘infinitely adaptable market’, total price awareness, production is consumer focussed, no ‘inefficiencies’, no ‘public goods’, and no ‘externalities’ (Wright, 2002).  There are many economists who, whilst agreeing with economic theory, consider that the reality is that none of these conditions are met anywhere near this level of perfection, nor will they.

For those who criticise with a normative or moral argument, they have other concerns, usually in consideration of society at large.  The ‘economic irrationalists’ claim that this perfect market scenario cannot exist, and claim that instead of overall positive gains, society, in particular those ‘less well off’, have faced negative outcomes.  These outcomes are not all financial; they claim not only are people becoming poorer, but that social capacity is being eroded.  Wright (2002) informs that ‘[a] balanced life becomes harder’.  This is because the critics of economic liberalisation claim that these policies bring with them job losses and a reduction in job creation, showing the economic uncertainty faced by all workers and jobseekers.  These factors all affect the lower income bracket more harshly than other sectors.  This leads to lower income workers having to work longer, reducing their ability to fulfil their social needs, and earning relatively less pay, leaving them financially worse off (Pusey, 2003, see also Argy, 2009, Argy, 2007a, b, 2006).

Another loss appearing to be caused by economic rationalism is that of ‘inefficient’ industry, further taking away from the job market, and removing future opportunities for nation-building; ‘greater inequality both in terms of income and opportunity’; and the loss of ‘free’ cultural and social facilities (for these points and more, see Kenyon, 2000, Argy, 2006).

The ‘irrationalists’ emphasise that the only concern of business and the market is efficiency and profit margins, and claim that this is socially negative.  Sue Rigney eloquently highlights the sentiments of many in opposition to economic rationalisation:

‘Economic rationalisation essentially contradicts an inherent role of government which includes equity and access issues. It is sound “business” practice to centralise and rationalise services but the provision of information does not fall neatly within the numbers game.’ (1999)

Replacing the ‘provision of information’ with the provision of any other social good can result in similar sentiments across a wide section of society.

There are indeed benefits of economic rationalisation; however these benefits are not equally distributed, and effectively do not outweigh the costs.

 

Bibliography

Argy, F. (2006) ‘Australia a land of opportunity: but not for all’, Dissent,  (21), 57-60.

Argy, F. (2007a) ‘Distribution effects of labour deregulation’, Agenda (Canberra, ACT), 14 (2), 141-155.

Argy, F. (2007b) ‘Economic freedom: the good and the ugly’, AQ, Journal of Contemporary Analysis, 79 (5), 33-39.

Argy, F. (2009) ‘Choosing between classical liberalism and social liberalism’, Policy (St Leonards, NSW), 25 (2), 14-20.

Kenyon, P. (2000) ‘The Good Society: A Guide to Economic Policy’, Agenda, 7 (4), 303-320.

Moore, D. (2001) ‘The case for economic rationalism’, Economic Papers (Sydney), 20 (4), 82-89.

Pusey, M. (2003) Experience of Middle Australia, The: Dark Side of Economic Reform, Cambridge University Press.

Quiggins, J. (1997) ‘Economic Rationalism’, Crossings, 2 (1), 3-12.

Richardson, J. L. (1997) ‘Economic Rationalism And The Scholarly Culture’, in Scholars, Libraries Collecting Policies and Archives Policy, Canberra, Canberra: Independent Scholars Association of Australia Inc.

Rigney, S. (1999) ‘Economic rationalisation and its effect on government services’, in 8th Asia-Pacific Specials, Health and Law Librarians Conference, Australian Library and Information Association.

Wright, J. (2002) The ethics of economic rationalism, Sydney:University of New South Wales Press.

 

 

 

Short Essay: The Australian Constitution: historical origins, and adequacy as a ‘superior law’

The Australian constitution is over one hundred years old, and reflects its historical origins in a number of ways.  Is it possible that this document still reflects Australia?  Taking an overall view, it can be said that it is adequate, however could also benefit from clarification.

A number of key players in the push for federation had ostensibly saw a need for ‘joining forces’ in areas of common interest, but were willing to accept compromises that would get the ball rolling; perhaps not expecting that the constitution would remain relatively unchanged for this length of time.  When the colonies first considered the constitution, they were highly supportive of the British parliamentary system; however an admiration for America’s constitutional changes had an effect on the way the founders’ considered the future of Australia.  While the founders’ did not wish to break British ties as America did, they saw benefits to the American system of ‘federalism’, since none of the colonial politicians were particularly willing to give much ground in the granting of power to the central government, instead preferring to retain their power, and limiting the national government to specific areas. However federalism and the British parliamentary system of responsible government do not always fit together, which can lead to the electorate losing faith in government, since it is the conventions of responsible government ‘that predisposed the electorate to have faith in government’ (Bagehot, as cited in Cornford, 2005).  The implementation of federalism was a measure of political compromise, since the colonial governments had already rejected or delayed the ‘federation project’ several times.  They were aware that there may be conflict with federalism and the Westminster system, but considered that the ‘unwritten conventions’ that they were adopting would provide sufficient guidance to manage them.

The constitution also suggests its origins through the features it lacks (see Aitken & Orr, 2002, Ward & Stewart, 2010, Singleton et al., 2003).  There is no recognition of rights, as the founders’ largely considered that common law would best protect rights, making a separate ‘Bill of Rights’ unnecessary; it contains no confirmation of commitment to democracy; and no provision of universal suffrage, since there were no women in the constitutional delegations, and they only had the right to vote in two states.  However, the constitution did include two references to Indigenous Australians, which pointed to its origins – the references were ‘dismissive’ (Aitken & Orr, 2002), and were removed by an overwhelmingly supported referendum in 1967.

The constitution itself is a highly legalistic document which is vague on details, which makes its’ adequacy as the body of superior law in Australia debatable.  Additionally, much of our society and government has been changed by events since the constitution was written.  The shaping of the constitution itself meant it was also necessary to create an adjudicator, the High Court, who manages disputes between States and the Commonwealth.  They have come under fire in recent years, being accused of ‘activism’ by interpreting the law away from strictly black letter law, to a more socio-political interpretation (see Ward & Stewart, 2010, Singleton et al., 2003, Galligan, 2003, Aitken & Orr, 2002).  In light of these factors, several calls have been made to modernise the constitution.  There have been calls for a Republic; attempts to reduce Senate power; clarification and codification of ‘implied’ features like reserve powers and some conventions; calls for centralisation, either through disbanding or replacing states with lesser powered ‘regional’ governments; clarification or redefinition of state and commonwealth powers; and calls to introduce a specific ‘Bill of Rights’ as constitutions in other nations provide for (Ward & Stewart, 2010, Aitken & Orr, 2002, Singleton et al., 2003, Galligan, 2003).

However, changes to the constitution have historically been hard to make.  This may point to its wide acceptance by the community, but may also reflect another, less benign reason.  Ward and Stewart (2010) point out that one intended design feature of the constitution, s. 128, is seemingly ‘undemocratic’.  This section requires a ‘double majority’ – a vote must be carried by a ‘democratic’ majority of all voters, across a majority of states.  This was intended to ensure that the ‘majority’ populated states could not overpower the ‘minority’ populated states.  It is interesting to note that this is considered blatantly undemocratic by some, but others consider it akin to extra-democratic in its ‘protection’ of minority populations (Galligan, 2003, Singleton et al., 2003, Aitken & Orr, 2002).

Possibly due to its vagueness giving rise to flexibility in interpretation, the constitution has stood the test of time, and still maintains its relevance today; however with society ever changing, it is important to ensure the ‘superior body of law’ continues to reflect the nation.  The possibility of reform should not be discarded.

 

Bibliography

Aitken, G. & Orr, R. (2002) Sawer’s: The Australian Constitution 3rd ed., Canberra:Australian Government Solicitor.

Cornford, I. (2005) ‘Changes to the Australian Public Service: Some Deleterious Effects Upon Political Accountability and VET Policy Formation and Implementation’, AARE 2004 Conference Papers,  available: http://www.aare.edu.au/04pap/cor04940.pdf.

Galligan, B. (2003) ‘Federalism and the Constitution’ in The Cambridge handbook of social sciences in Australia,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singleton, G., Aitken, D., Jinks, B. & Warhurst, J. (2003) Australian political institutions, 7th ed., Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.:Pearson Education.

Ward, I. & Stewart, R. G. (2010) Politics One, 4th ed., South Melbourne:Palgrave Macmillan Australia.

Short Essay: Strengths and Weaknesses of Federalism for Australia

The acceptance of Australias’ constitution created a system of government for its disparate colonies, in the form of a ‘federation’.  Explanation varies as to why this form of government was chosen, which has faced a decline in popularity (Ward & Stewart, 2010, Galligan, 2003), with claims of inherent weaknesses.  To explore this, the strengths of federalism, along with these identified weaknesses will be highlighted.

The disparate colonies, with differing needs and difficulties, had developed their own ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, as cited in Barker & Kelly, 2008, p. 129), which gave rise to differing outlooks and goals.  Federalism, which allowed the retainment of this shared community and ‘local patriotism’ (Craven, 2001, Gillespie, 1994), was seen as the method where the colonies could join together for issues of national importance, whilst retaining their own identities.  This feature of the constitution allowed the states to have an individual ability to set policy priorities, and develop responses that were specific to their circumstances, and their respective electorates.  This is the likely reason why federalism is seen as ‘closer to the people’, with the ability to be more responsive to the needs of their electorates, and so being more accountable to them.  Arguably, this was the founders’ intention (Galligan, 2003, Ward & Stewart, 2010, Singleton et al., 2003).

This ‘tailoring’ approach was not the only benefit here, since by allowing different policies in the states, and utilising the competitive spirit that developed within this evolving community, new policies were able to be ‘tested’, allowing for a wider range of policy mixes that ‘work’ to be found, which could subsequently be copied or innovated by the other states.  Unfortunately, this competitive spirit has also had a negative effect, in that policies that require collaboration and agreement between the states can be difficult to achieve (Singleton et al., 2003, Ward & Stewart, 2010).

Co-ordinate federalism, where the states had clearly defined and separate roles than that of the federal government was the expectation at Australias’ formation  (Singleton et al., 2003).  Over time, this has changed to become increasingly collaborative, to a ‘cooperative federalism’ (Ward & Stewart, 2010).  This has become necessary not least because of relatively recent changes to taxation, where the Commonwealth government now has ‘fiscal dominance’ (Ward & Stewart, 2010), where they are the primary collector of revenue, creating a Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI).  This provides the commonwealth government with considerably more leverage to govern spending policy, which were decisions intended for states.  This control of spending policy has hindered the founders’ intended limits on government (Ward & Stewart, 2010).

In addition to the VFI, some federal services and policies now encroach onto state territory, leading to some area of duplication (Ward & Stewart, 2010, Singleton et al., 2003).  This can have negative consequences, primarily in lesser efficiency because there is ‘too much government’ (Abbot, as cited in Ward & Stewart, 2010); however it can also be argued that this can provide benefits to the electorate, in that they can pursue alternate avenues for resolution of difficulties (Singleton et al., 2003, Ward & Stewart, 2010).

I have shown that the strengths of federalism are: being closer to the people, increasing responsiveness and accountability; acts as a limit on government, has allowed the cultures of the states to flourish, has provided the ability to utilise different policies based on state differences, and allowed testing of new ideas before mass implementation, to find policy mixes that work.  I have also established the antagonistic features; the primary concerns with federalism are duplication of services, VFI, difficulties in securing national agreement and ‘too much government’.

 

Bibliography

Barker, J. & Kelly, S. (2008) ‘Technology and Nationalism’ in G. Herb & D. Kaplan, (eds.), Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview,Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 126-136.

Craven, G. 2001. The Australian States and the Australian Nation. in Sunday Special – The Barton Lectures Part 7 Australian Broadcasting Commission, Australia: Radio National. Radio (Transcript).

Gillespie, J. (1994) ‘New federalisms’ in J. Brett, J. Gillespie & M. Goot, (eds.), Developments in Australian Politics,60-87.

Galligan, B. (2003) ‘Federalism and the Constitution’ in The Cambridge handbook of social sciences in Australia,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singleton, G., Aitken, D., Jinks, B. & Warhurst, J. (2003) Australian political institutions, 7th ed., Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.:Pearson Education.

Ward, I. & Stewart, R. G. (2010) Politics One, 4th ed., South Melbourne:Palgrave Macmillan Australia.

 

The Symposium on Australian Settlement

It is widely accepted that the past can influence the future.  This is the dominant discourse which surrounds the concept of an ‘Australian Settlement’.  Posited as the ‘more or less enduring resolution of conflict’ (Stokes 2004a, p. 5) that created bipartisan support for particular ‘political ideas and policies’ (Stokes 2004a, p. 7), this ‘settlement’ seeks to define an Australian political identity which guided Australia from Federation through to the 1980’s.  However, this ‘Australian Settlement’ has now crumbled, and our society is significantly different.  While it is a relevant tool for studying political history, a genuine understanding of modern politics cannot be reached through study of the ‘Australian Settlement’ alone, because the forms presented have been decontextualised, are selective in features and its focus on the past does not assist to provide direction for the future.

Decontextualisation

Politics is not a distinct super-section of Australia.  It is, according to our ‘style’ of democracy, theoretically representative of our population, by extension, politics should reflect the values of our society. This means that past policies cannot be accurately viewed, or fairly judged, exclusively from this angle.  To obtain a genuine understanding of Australian politics, it is necessary to consider the societal context, discourses of assent and dissent, as well as the underlying beliefs and motivations for particular policy decisions.

In this, Stokes (2004a) attempts to be more flexible, however much is still judged based on current values, and neglects how ‘progressive’ much of the early years were, and is based on the authors own underlying values.  As Melleuish informs, ‘… in an age which no longer accepts its values, we are apt to forget its positive aspects and its virtues’ (Melleuish 1995, p. 131).  When approaching the ‘Settlement’ from a modern perspective, issues are seen with the management of race and gender relations, the inequalities in democratic institutions, increases in the role of the state, an increasingly insular country.  However, in most cases, this modern perspective means these problems are considered in conjunction with persuasive discourses, positive or negative, towards neo-liberalism, and globalisation (Conley 2004).  If viewed from the perspective of the makers themselves, the view would likely be quite different.  The context, intent and outcomes should be judged holistically.

Selective in features

The governments of federation, and still today are, to varying degrees, ‘social liberal’.  Many of the ‘settlement’ policies were not, as Kelly appears to assert, purely economic, but had significant social basis, which Stokes incorporates, albeit at a reduced importance (2004a, p. 15).  Also, as seen in the symposium, the ‘Australian Settlement’ as originally written had ‘limited scope’ (2004a, p. 9), and as Brett (2004) notes, even Stokes’ expanded version of the settlement misses key considerations.  While the idea of an ‘Australian Settlement’ has gained significant currency, there are still significant points of contention.  By choosing elements and framing them in particular ways it becomes possible to alter the discourse these elements are subjected to, allowing both the ‘identity’ and individual component discourses to be usurped to a particular purpose (Stokes 2004a, p. 7; see also Conley 2004).

Past focused

Stokes (2004a, p. 5) correctly asserts that future directions are shaped by ‘past errors and achievements’.  It is, however, unfair to consider that all of the Australian Settlement was worthy of being discarded as a ‘past error’, and the policies enacted to remove the ‘pillars’ as being the ‘achievements’.  A holistic judgement of political history does indeed give us insight into how, and why policies were enacted; however this insight does not really provide direction for our future.  Society has undergone significant changes, as have the political and economic imperatives now faced.  It would be imprudent to deny any possibility of enacting similar policy again.

Stokes’ contribution to the identity discourse of an ‘Australian Settlement’ is significant to providing a good underpinning knowledge and understanding of Australia’s political history, however it cannot provide a stable platform for understanding modern politics, or the politics of the future.  Looking to the past for shaping the future has its own problems, and it would be easy to consider that at the end of the next ‘settlement’, which is not yet formed, the decisions made now may be judged in the future to be incorrect.  Priorities should be clearly focused on the present, working for the future, rather than looking back.

 

Bibliography

Brennan G & Pincus J. (2002) From the Australian Settlement to Microeconomic reform: the Change in Twentieth Century Policy Regimes. CIES Discussion Paper No. 0213. Adelaide, SA: Adelaide University.

Brett J. (2004) Comment: the country and the city. Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 27 – 29.

Conley T. (2004) Globalisation and the Politics of Persuasion and Coercion. Australian Journal of Social Issues 39:2, 183-200.

Kelly P. (2004) Comment: the Australian settlement. Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 23 – 25.

Melleuish G. (1995) Understanding an “Age of Uncertainty”. Australian Journal of Politics & History 41:1, 130-134.

Sawer M. (2004) Comment: the Australian settlement undone. Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 35 – 37.

Smyth P. (2004) Comment: Australian settlement or Australian way? Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 39 – 41.

Stewart RG & Ward I. (2010) Politics One, South Melbourne: Palgrave Macmillan Australia.

Stokes G. (2004a) The ‘Australian settlement’ and Australian political thought. Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 5 – 22.

Stokes G. (2004b) A rejoinder. Australian Journal of Political Science 39:1, 43 – 47.

Tom Conleys ‘Globalisation and the Politics of Persuasion and Coercion’

A Critical Review of Tom Conleys 2004 article, ‘Globalisation and the Politics of Persuasion and Coercion’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 39, Issue 2.

The authors objective in this article is to show that politics worldwide has been significantly impacted by the ‘discourse and practice of globalisation’ (Conley 2004, p. 195).  The three salient, interlinked themes are ideology, persuasion and coercion, which together, the author claims, have led to a singular view of reality, persuasively presented to the public, followed by coercive implementation of an economic liberal agenda; all alternatives having been marginalised.

Ideological and Material Components of Globalisation

The first theme discusses the effect of political ideology on globalisation.  The author claims that equal, bilateral consideration needs to be given for ‘ideas, rhetoric and discourse’ and material components of globalisation, since it is the ideological factors that influence perceptions of political economic policy constraints and opportunities (Conley 2004, p. 186), and the material components that provide the structural limitations.  Further, it is argued that ‘dominant interpretations’ can influence the fulfilment of the process, and change the political environment (ibid., p. 186).

According to the author, governments have developed a ‘deterministic’ evaluation and liberalising reaction to globalisation.  The author concedes that various political and economic events caused a shift in policy perception, and equates this with liberalised policy changes becoming institutionalised ideology.  This may be partially accurate, however the article appears to neglect the impact of the growing strength of global institutions such as the World Bank and World Trade Organisation, which have placed considerable pressure on states to implement a neo-liberal structure (Firth 2005, p. 11).

Whilst the argument that ideology certainly impacts world views and narrows the range of options which are open for consideration is acceptable, the author does not do enough to show that ‘at each point of material change’ Conley 2004, p. 186) there were alternative interpretations of this ‘material reality’ (ibid.) leading to differing policy when considering the impact of the world economy.

Globalisation as Persuasion

Closely linked with ideology, the second theme contends that globalisation has been framed as an ‘international imperative’ (Conley 2001, p. 241, 2004, p. 184), to persuade the population that liberalisation of the economy was the best, indeed, ‘only viable option’ (Conley 2004, p. 185).  It is ultimately claimed that globalisation is the justification for the shift to economic liberalism.  It is also suggested that the government has used ‘persuasion’ to lower the publics’ expectations of the state (Conley 2001, p. 241, 2004, pp. 184, 188).

With a degree of rhetoric, the author presents these ideas, and attempts to persuade.  His primary argument has an element of success, effectively showing that governments have used persuasive methods, to both push globalisation as a national good, and also showing that a degree of public ‘education’ has taken place, espousing the same notion.  The use of the term ‘education’ has negative connotations in the article, and the authors own beliefs come through strongly in this section.  The author places negative images of various changes, both at a social and political level, however beyond his own use of language and interpretation, there is little that shows ‘economic liberal’ globalisation has caused this.  It could be argued that it is actually the social changes have led to this change.

Economic Liberal Coercion

After persuasion paves the way, it is argued that coercion, in the form of ‘economic liberal policy change’ is then used to enforce change (Conley 2001, p. 241, 2004, p. 192).  According to the author, the public has been coerced into becoming market driven and self-regulating, ‘succeeding and failing on market terms’ (Conley 2004, p. 193).  Further, economic liberal coercion has allowed the role of the state to limit itself, as well as ultimately limiting political choice with an institutionalised conception of globalisation and state capability.  Since coercion ‘has’ the effect of modifying the economic policy ‘terrain’ (Conley 2001, p. 241), and ‘economic liberal globalisation has dominated the perceptions of those who have made the decisions’ (Conley 2004, p. 195), then, he informs, that this has the additional effect of reinforcing ‘the already substantive constraints of the world political economy’ (ibid., p. 192).

There is an degree of contradiction here.  While the author first informs that governments are not as tightly constrained by global forces as they claim, here it is stated that they are constrained.

The author certainly points out some inherent issues with economic liberal policies in this section, and clearly demonstrates the economical effect on several sections of community and industry.  However it is a large leap to claim such a change has come from a small group of politicians, at a certain time.  The concepts that underpin economic liberalism are not new, nor is the idea of globalisation.

The author suggests that effective ‘social democratic globalisation’ alternatives to liberalisation exist (Conley 2004, p. 195), however they have been marginalised by the liberalised, institutionalised ideas of the two major parties.

Overall

Language use in the article is overall reasonable, however the use of some terms can be perceived as loaded.  The bias against ‘economic liberal’ globalisation is quite evident, and there is emphasis on the social inequalities ‘created’ by economic liberal globalisation.  It is apparent that the author places all onus on government, when that government was ‘elected’ by the nation; it would seem that some of the blame should be accepted by the voting populace.  It is therefore surprising that more sociological data was not considered, as particular trends in sociology are likely to have considerable application in this area.

Conclusion

The author certainly succeeds in demonstrating that since the Hawke/Keating years, the dominant theories of globalisation have led to adoption of economic liberal policies.  Overall, the article succeeds in showing the main portions of his argument, however in many cases it raises more questions than answers.

(Western et al. 2007)

 

Bibliography

Conley T. (2001) The Domestic Politics of Globalisation. Australian Journal of Political Science 36:2, 223-246.

Conley T. (2004) Globalisation and the Politics of Persuasion and Coercion. Australian Journal of Social Issues 39:2, 183-200.

Firth S. (2005) Australia in International Politics : An introduction to Australian foreign policy. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Western M, Baxter J, Pakulski J, Tranter B, Western J, van Egmond M, Chesters J, Hosking A, O’Flaherty M & van Gellecum Y. (2007) Neoliberalism, Inequality and Politics: The Changing Face of Australia. Australian Journal of Social Issues 42:3, 401-418.

 

Change & Motion in Pre-Socratic Philosophy

Introduction

The Pre-Socratic philosophers were involved in a search for the true nature of reality.  One of the questions they looked for answers to was the problem of change.  On one hand, change seems obvious; sensory experience provides ample evidence for change.  On the other, change is a denial of stable identity and knowledge.  The primary two philosophers who wrestled with this problem, Heraclitus and Parmenides, positioned themselves at opposite ends of a continuum; at one end, with change as a ‘constant’, there is Heraclitus, while at the other end, with a total unity, and only apparent change, there is Parmenides.  Through an examination of their remaining fragments, their arguments for, and against change will be highlighted, and some interesting similarities mentioned.  To close, a brief summary and evaluation will be presented.

Heraclitus

Change is fundamental to Heraclitus’ system, however his thoughts are as interconnected as his theory.  To enable a full appreciation of his change doctrine, mention must be made of his epistemological stance and his views on ‘the one and the many’ (McKirahan, 2010, p. 129).  This will proceed into his discussion of change, and the Logos which orders it.

Heraclitus leans towards empiricism; he tells us that ‘All that can be seen, heard, experienced – these are what I prefer’ (DK22B55, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 115).   The correct use of the senses can provide useful information, which must then be analysed through the understanding of the Logos.  This is because some, even after they have heard the truth, are like the deaf; they fail to comprehend (DK22B34, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 114).  Sensory experience must be supplemented through the Logos, which is ‘common’ to all, just as thinking is. (see DK22B2 & DK22B113, in McKirahan, 2010, pp. 112, 114).  To speak with understanding, one must rely upon this Logos (see DK22B114, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 117).

‘Listening ….. to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one’ (DK22B50, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 116); however this unity is not a simple one.  It is a unity comprised of many interconnected parts, and can be separated and re-formed.  Things taken together are whole and not whole, <something that is> being brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity and out of a unity all things’ (DK22B10, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 116).  While it is important to see the diversity in the nature of things, it is just as necessary to see the unity which underlies it.  Likewise, it is important to see the diversity within the apparently unified whole.  These connections are not always obvious, however this does not deny their power (see DK22B54, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 117).

This unity in diversity concept is highlighted in several statements made by Heraclitus.  Whilst seeming to be contradictory, by looking for the unapparent connections, through changing perspective, the unity becomes apparent.  While ‘the road up and down is one and the same’ appears contradictory, by understanding it in context of perspective between two places, the contradiction dissipates, and the unity becomes clear.

Heraclitus also brings the world’s dichotomous nature to the fore.  Without knowledge of injustice, it would be impossible to understand what justice is.  Without disease, health would be unappreciated; without hunger, satiety would be meaningless (see DK22B23 & DK22B111, in McKirahan, 2010).  This is not just a feature of language; it is a fundamental opposition driving change.  All things come to be through opposition, though a constant, equal exchange like ‘… goods for gold, and gold for goods’ (DK22B80, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120).  This is a constant feature of the cosmos; ‘… the ever-living fire is kindled in measures and extinguished in measures’ (DK22B30, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120), just as the turnings of the cycle of elements are exchanged for one another, in the same ratios  (DK22B31, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120).  This constant war of all things is entirely necessary (DK22B80, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120).

This constant cycle of change and motion, with opposites constantly vying for supremacy, is epitomised in Heraclitus’ river fragment ‘Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and again different waters flow’ (DK22B12, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 118).  While the identity of the river is somewhat constant, this quote suggests that the rivers very identity relies upon the constant flow of water.  The river could not actually be a river if it was not constantly in motion (Kirk & Raven, 1957, p. 194).

The change Heraclitus sees has both randomness and order.  While ‘the most beautiful kosmos is a pile of things poured out at random’ (DK22B124, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 117), there is an underlying unified order, the Logos.  The logos, therefore, also represents Heraclitus’ ultimate metaphysical principle, in addition to being an epistemological one.  It is an incarnation of ‘the ever-living fire’, the true nature of the soul, the ultimate power, and the law which judges (DK22B66, in McKirahan, 2010, pp. 120, 141).

For Heraclitus, then, the cosmos is in a constant and dynamic cycle of change and motion.  However this view was challenged by the arguments put forward by Parmenides, who considered rational thought to be superior to sensory experience.  This rationalism led him to the belief that there was no becoming, only ‘what-is’, which remained static.

Parmenides

Change and motion are impossible for Parmenides.  To understand why, his epistemological position must be considered, along with his distinction between reality and the world of appearances.  Then his argument on the true nature of reality will be presented, leading into a discussion of his argument against change and motion.

Parmenides rejected the notion that the senses could be used to gain true knowledge, which places him firmly with the rationalists.  He considered the senses to be a source of illusion, causing the ‘real world’ to appear different to its actual nature.  His goddess warns him not to follow the path which his senses lead him, as this will send him to the path of mortal opinion, instead of Truth.  For truth, he must ‘not let habit, rich in experience, compel [him] along this route to direct an aimless eye and an echoing ear and tongue, but judge by reason the much contested examination spoken by me. (DK28B7, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 147).  This is not a typical goddess; he is not asked to blindly follow her dictates, but instead is required to critically evaluate the reasoning she provides, and judge by reason.

The path travelled by sensory experience is the world of appearances, to be understood as the ‘mere opinions of mortals, in which there is no genuine conviction’ (DK28B1, in Smith et al., p. 31).  This route allows all manner of incorrect assumptions, including the belief that it is possible to know ‘what is not’.  However, it is impossible to ‘know what is not […] [or] declare it’ (DK28B2, in McKirahan, 2010, pp. 146, 154).  Instead of this path, he is told he should follow truth.

The truth is ‘that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, steadfast, and complete’.  It has no beginning, nor end, because this would require it to come from ‘what is not’, that is, nothing; there is also no reason for it to begin at one time, as opposed to any other (DK28B8, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 147).  These comprise the first components of the argument against genesis, that ‘nothing comes from nothing’, and an early form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  Parmenides’ goddess follows this up with the impossibility of generation; since if something came to be, then this would mean there was a time where it did not exist, and would require creation ex nihilo.  This argument can be summarised as follows:

1. Nothing can come to be or cease to be
   1. If it did, must be a time when it did not exist
   2. If it did not exist at a prior time, it must have been created from nothing
2. Ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing)
3. There is no sufficient reason for anything to begin at any one time, as opposed to any other
4. what-is is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, steadfast, and complete

The goddess goes on to claim that this totally unified reality is indivisible, because it is entirely the same as everything else.  There is no space, no gaps; ‘what is draws near to what is’ (DK28B8, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 147) and it is motionless, ‘without starting or ceasing’ since without a coming to be, or passing away, there is no change; and motion is essentially a type of change.  This is essentially the refutation of change and motion; it could be standardised as follows:

1. There can be no change
   1. Change implies difference from one time to another
   2. There is no difference, it is entirely the same, and indivisible.
2. There can be no movement
   1. Movement implies a ceasing to be (in one place) and a coming to be (in a different place)
   2. There is no space within ‘the limits of great bonds’ (DK28B8, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 147)

This leads us to the conclusion that change and motion cannot exist, since they entail difference and a ceasing to be of one kind, and a coming to be of a different kind.  This is impossible, because Being is inviolable (DK28B8, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 147), and genesis is impossible from nothing (Kirk & Stokes, 1960).

Analysis

From the outlines above, the differences between these two accounts of change are highly visible, though it makes it easy to draw the conclusion that Heraclitus and Parmenides have nothing in common. However they do have some commonalities, even if they use these towards opposite ends.  Two similarities which become apparent are the distinction between appearance and reality, and the necessity of the conservation of mass and energy.

Firstly, both Heraclitus and Parmenides drew a distinction between appearance and reality. Heraclitus found that ‘humans are like the inexperienced’ when trying to understand him, and the Logos (DK22B1, in McKirahan, p. 112), just as they are unable to grasp how a bow, ‘though at variance with itself, it agrees with itself’ (DK22B51, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 116).  This is similar to the conception found in Parmenides Proem, where his Goddess tells him that there are different conceptions of reality; a ‘Truth’, and the way of mortal opinion (DK28B1, in McKirahan, 2010, pp. 145,146).  This is compounded by the lack of judgement that the mortal ‘hordes’ have, in their inability to use reason (DK28B6, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 146).

Secondly, Heraclitus and Parmenides both appear to agree with an early conception of the ‘law of the conservation of mass and energy’, though they take this concept towards opposing ends.  Heraclitus uses the idea of conservation several times; firstly with the notion that the elements are transformed in accordance with the measured ratio of its quantity prior to transformation (DK22B31, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120), and secondly, that the cosmos is kindled in measures and being extinguished in measures (DK22B30, in McKirahan, 2010, p. 120).  While all things change, or are transformed, these are done in equivalent measures.  Parmenides, on the other hand, uses the concept of conservation to argue against generation or perishing.  With the unspoken premise that there is something which exists, any generation or perishing would mean creation ex nihilo, or perishing into what-is-not.  Since Parmenides believes he has provided strong reasons for discounting these possibilities, the essential unity of being must be conserved eternally, and so discounting any possibility of change or motion.

Conclusion

There are substantial difficulties in analysing the Presocratics, not least the fragmentary nature of their writing.  Heraclitus and Parmenides each offer individual challenges, with the lack of explicitness in their writing, it becomes possible to put forward various alternative interpretations.  However, their contribution to science and philosophy has been profound.  They presented new ways of thinking, highlighting the ways in which the world is viewed, and forcing a reinvestigation of those beliefs.  They challenge all of science and philosophy to account for their findings, and the fact that these ideas, in some respects, are still relevant to ongoing discussion on the possibility of change after more than 2000 years is testament to their worth.

 

 

Bibliography

Curd, P. (2009) ‘Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality’ in M. L. Gill & P. Pellegrin, (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 34 – 55.

Curd, P. & McKirahan, R. D. (2011) A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia, 2nd ed.,  Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co.

Graham, D. W. (2008) ‘Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge’ in P. Curd & D. W. Graham, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 169 – 188.

Kirk, G. S. & Raven, J. E. (1957) The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection Of Texts, London: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, G. S. & Stokes, M. C. (1960) ‘Parmenides’ Refutation of Motion’, Phronesis, 5 (1), 1 – 4.

McKirahan, R. D. (2010) Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with texts and commentary, 2nd ed.,  Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co.

Roochnik, D. (2004) Retrieving the Ancients: An Introduction to Greek Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Smith, N., Allhoff, F. & Vaidya, A. J. (2008) Ancient Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary, Blackwell Readings in the HIstory of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

 

 

Hume vs. the Rationalists

For referencing Hume’s work, I have adopted what appears to be the standard form of paragraph notation, with the letter ‘T’ (for the Treatise) or ‘E’ (for the Enquiry) along with the paragraph number where available.

Introduction

Hume’s ‘empirical project’ was an attempt to dispense with uselessly abstract rationalist metaphysics which posited ideas beyond what could reasonably be known, and encourage a new ‘science of man’ to replace it.  The key part of this project was to support sense-experience as the source of knowledge about the world, in direct opposition to claims of the rationalists who appeal to innate and a priori knowledge of the world.  The implications of Hume’s project had far reaching effects, particularly highlighted in relation to Hume’s attack on the notion of causation.  First, there will be a brief discussion of Hume’s ‘empirical project’, and its position in the Rationalist vs. Empiricist divide.  This will be followed by Hume’s theory of ideas. Finally, we will consider Hume’s arguments on causation, considering the radical change from the rationalist position.

Hume’s Empirical Project, and Rationalism vs. Empiricism

Hume’s ‘empirical project’ was a reaction against rationalist metaphysics.  The crux of the debate was over epistemology; the nature of our sources of knowledge.  It is a question about how we know certain propositions. A Rationalist view generally considers it possible that some knowledge is certain and immutable; because some, or all of our knowledge can be discovered ‘a priori’, without experience, whether this is ‘innate knowledge’, ‘innate concepts’ or through ‘intuition [and] deduction’ deduction’ (Markie, 2012).  Consider Descartes’ innate ideas of himself as a thinking thing, as well of his idea of God (Descartes, 2008, pp. 18, 37).

However, Hume considered the Rationalist argument to be generally inconsistent, and sometimes completely incompatible (Dicker, 1998), even though this knowledge was supposed to be known beyond doubt, a priori.  Instead of this ‘false’ metaphysics (E, S1.12 Hume, 2007), Hume proposed a new ‘science of human nature’ (E, S1.1) which would provide satisfaction in knowing what it is possible to know (E, S1.13) but also would curb the excesses of the ‘abstruse philosophy’ which has ‘sheltered… superstition’ (E, S1.17).  This would be an empiricist view, which did not rely upon these notions, claiming instead that humans are essentially born as a ‘tabula rasa’ (Locke, 1690), a blank slate, upon which all knowledge is written by way of experience, ‘a posteriori’. As Scruton (2002) notes ‘there can be no concept except where there is experience’ (p. 123).  However, Hume goes even further, to argue that our beliefs in such things as causation, substance and self are purely inferences that we draw, rather than certain knowledge.  This has profound effects on the possibility of metaphysics as a discipline; Hume’s new science, should it succeed, would largely discard rationalist metaphysics. To begin his project, he considers the nature of experience, and the origin of our ideas.

Hume’s theory of ideas

We experience through perception: our perceptions of the mind are divided into two ‘species’ which are differentiated by their ‘force and vivacity’ (E, S2.3). ‘Impressions’, the more forceful of our perceptions contain ‘all our sensations, passions and emotions’ (T, 1.1), whether they be ‘outward’ from sensation, or ‘inward’ from reflection. while ‘Ideas’ are the ‘less lively perceptions’ belonging to the memory or imagination that we are conscious of when we reflect upon impressions (E, S2.3).  Both ‘species’ can be further subdivided as simple, that ‘admit[s] of no distinction nor separation’ (T, 1.1.1.2) or complex, formed from two or more simple ones, and can be ‘distinguished into parts’ (T, 1.1.1.2; see also Merrill, p. 32).  Following from this, Hume sets as his ‘one general proposition, that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent’ (T1.1.1.7 in Hume, 2009).  This is often called the ‘copy principle’ (Fieser, 2011; Morris, 2009), in that simple ideas are ‘copied’ from simple impressions.

Consider this piece of paper; the visual experience of deciphering shapes on the page, the tactile sensations from the feel of the paper in your hand.  Once you place it down, and are no longer directly experiencing the direct sense impression of the paper, you have the reflective capacity to form ideas in your mind of the paper, where you can bring back an image of the paper and recall these sensations.  In this case, you could even break down the idea you have of the paper into the particular ideas about its texture, colour and the ‘inward’ sensations of how you felt reading it.  You do not ‘experience’ ideas, they are memories of experience, and can be built upon in the imagination.  Perhaps you combine your idea of this paper, and your ideas of error, and create an idea in your imagination of this paper covered in red crosses! From multiple simple ideas, a complex idea has formed in the imagination, even though this object does not exist (yet).  However, the reverse is also true; by considering our ‘complex’ ideas, whether from memory or imagination, we can break them down into their component parts to find the ‘impressions’ from which they are derived.  It is through this method that Hume claims we can identify whether our ideas have meaning.

When we want to determine whether a term or concept has meaning, ‘we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?’ (E, 2.9) If we are unable to find its simple impression, then ‘this will serve to confirm our suspicion’ (E, 2.9) that they are meaningless.  Our ideas are not simply the materials of thought, but also the arbiters of meaning (Noonan, p. 93).

So, to consider the limits of human reason, Hume divides it into two categories.  The first, ‘Relations of Ideas’, concerned with definitions and mathematical-logical relations, allows some ‘intuitively certain’ knowledge.  However, this knowledge is limited in scope to demonstrable propositions which do not assert or imply the existence of ‘non-abstract identities’ (Dicker, 1998, pp. 36, 37, 39) because they simply show the relations between entities.  Consider mathematics; the proposition that 1 + 2 = 3, and we find that all this statement tells us is the relations between these three numbers (E, 4.1.1).  The second, ‘Matters of Fact’ are truths about the world which either assert or imply existence (Dicker, 1998, pp. 36, 37, 39); however these can only be obtained through experience.  That this keyboard will work this afternoon is a matter of fact; from considering that it is working as I type this, I induct from this the ‘fact’ that it will work later today; however this proposition can be falsified, because unlike the demonstrably true ‘relations of ideas’, there is no contradiction in this proposition.  This separation of ‘knowable propositions’ (Dicker, p. 36) has been termed ‘Hume’s fork’ (see Dicker; Merrill; Fieser).

These matters of fact are connected through various relations; our knowledge of the world relies upon assuming a regular ‘association of ideas’ (T, 3.8; E, 3).  This association of ideas centres around three ‘principles of connexion’ (E, 3.2) which allow for ‘transitions in thought … [and] explaining belief’ (Noonan, 1999, p. 73); ‘Resemblance’, where an impression prompts an idea of something which it resembles; ‘Contiguity in time or place’, where an impression prompts an idea of a further idea which was encountered at a similar time, or in a similar place; and ‘Cause or Effect’ (E, 3.2;  see also Noonan, 1999, p. 71).  The causal relation is the most important of these, because all of our reasoning concerning ‘matters of fact’ are founded on it, and it is the only one of the three relations which ‘can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel’ (T, 3.2; E, 4.4).  This brings us to our investigation of how Hume’s project radically shifted the understanding of causal relationships, against the rationalists.

Causation

The Rationalists had different conceptions of the nature of causality; Descartes’ takes it to be innate (Markie, 2012), Leibniz would present it as a form of ‘pre-established harmony’ between two ‘created’ substances (78, 79 in Leibniz, 2010; Bobro, 2009).  Both of these thinkers also allow for the interaction of their deity, which was also generally conceived to be the ‘first cause’.  What is common between them is that they all considered causal relations to ‘have an objective necessity’ that could not entertain doubt, as this notion did not come from sense-experience (Wilson, 2004, p. 267).  Hume, using his new theory of ideas, challenges: the possibility for innate ideas, through the empirical claims that ideas stem from experience, which determines its possible content; and also challenges the justification of causal relationships using ‘objective necessity’.  It is to this challenge on causal relationships that we now turn.

As discussed earlier, Hume claimed that all ‘matters of fact’ were grounded in experience, and depended on causal reasoning (E 2.2.14 in Hume, 2007, p. 23).  We also noted his claim that any attempt to go beyond the current contents of our sense experience requires considering the cause-effect relationship.  So, he endeavours to find the empirical evidence for our ‘knowledge’ of cause and effect.  Directly against the rationalists, he claims that we ‘know’ that a priori reasoning will not give us this knowledge (E, 4.6) since the effect is ‘totally different from the cause’ (E, 4.9).  With many different possible outcomes for any particular event, and no foundation for the preference of any particular outcome in ‘reason’, experience is required.  Any a priori attempt to ‘reason’ the effect from the cause without experience will mean inventing or imagining the event, and with nothing in the cause will be ‘entirely arbitrary’ (E, 4.11).

With the rationalists being denied innate ideas, and been dealt a strong blow to their understanding, Hume’s project continued.  Since the foundation of all reasoning concerning causal relations was experience, He wanted to know how it was that we come to our conclusions.  His answer was our experience of ‘constant conjunction’ of our ideas over a period of time (T, 1.3.6.3).  However, while we may observe two events that occur in conjunction, there is no way for us to know the nature of their connection. Consider this essay once again; if its author had developed a complex idea of ‘red crosses on marked essays’, and was aware of a constant conjunction of events, whereby at each instance of an ‘essay submission’ event previously, the author received red crosses, the author may infer based on the submission alone, that this essay will also be returned with red crosses.  Hume makes this explicit as two propositions:

‘I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects’ (E, 4.16)

We often implicitly assume the ‘Principle of the Uniformity of Nature’ (Lorkowski, 2010), in that we expect tomorrow to be like it was today.  However, is not contradictory to conceive of a change because there is nothing implicit in the first object that makes it necessary for a particular effect. It is for this reason that Hume considers inductive reasoning, whereby we generalise a conclusion based on a particular, to be weak; it leads to what is often known as the ‘problem of induction’ (Lorkowski, 2010). Hume claims we have no reason to appeal to past experience, because

‘reason can never show us the connexion of one object with another, tho’ aided by experience, and the observation of their conjunction in all past instances … it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects and unite them in the imagination’ (T, 1.3.6.12)

Rather than good reasoning, Our notion of causation is actually a ‘custom or habit’ (E 5.6; E 7.30).  Our belief of causation is formed by ideas  becoming ‘enlivened’ (E, 5.15) by a new impression that bears a relation to it.  While this belief stems from our very nature (E, 5.22), it is unfounded and meaningless according to his verification principle.  In spite of all this, Hume allows that we can still use induction, like causation, to function on a daily basis as long as we proportion the effect to the cause without ascribing qualities in excess of what can be known (E, 11.12; 12.25; 12.26).

Conclusion

Hume’s empirical project presents a strong challenge to rationalist metaphysics, showing us that we are, perhaps, not as rational as we once supposed, and the world is not as ordered as we assumed.  While the rationalists offered certain knowledge, at least for their own ‘brands’ of rationalism, Hume’s empiricism requires us to be uncertain, and always being aware of our limits.  For Hume, the Rationalist metaphysics was unacceptably abstract, and, in their denial of sense-experience, were contradictory.  With causation being so heavily implicit in our daily life, realising that we are much more creatures of habit rather than ‘rational animals’ goes some distance to show that appeals by the Rationalists for ‘innate ideas’ and a priori knowledge are unfounded; our knowledge is neither sure, nor as well grounded as the rationalists have posited.

Bibliography

Bobro, M. (2009) ‘Leibniz on Causation’ in E. N. Zalta, (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,Spring 2009 ed.,  [online], available: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/leibniz-causation.

Descartes, R. (2008) Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies, Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Dicker, G. (1998) Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction, New York:Routledge.

Fieser, J. (2011) ‘David Hume (1711-1776)’ in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,[online], available: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/#H2.

Hume, D. (2007) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Hume, D. (2009) A Treatise of Human Nature, The University of Adelaide Library [online], available: http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/.

Leibniz, G. W. (2010) The Monadology, Adelaide:The University of Adelaide Library.

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Markie, P. (2012) ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’ in E. N. Zalta, (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,Summer 2012 ed.,  [online], available: http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=rationalism-empiricism.

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‘Sapere Aude!’ Kant and the Public/Private Distinction

“Sapere Aude! […] Have the courage to use your own reason!” (Kant, 1997, p. 83, my emphasis)

Kant is economical: In this short quotation, he indicts society, credits them with universal reason, and calls them to action. The quote suggests that every individual1 has the capacity for reasoning; they simply lack the courage and will to do so; this, according to Kant, implicates us in a ‘self‐incurred tutelage’ (p. 83). Kant presents Enlightenment as the escape from this immaturity; all that was required was the freedom to ‘make public use of one’s reason’ (p. 84). However, everywhere there were limits on freedom; some constraints were necessary to maintain public order. The acceptable, and useful constraints on freedom could be found within a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’2 reason (pp. 84‐85). This distinction rests largely upon the degree of exclusivity, publicity, and emancipation from higher authority.

Kant sees society as immature, limiting itself to following the dictates of ‘benevolent’ authority figures who demand from ‘all sides, “Do not argue!” (p. 85), but adhere to ‘statutes and formulas’ without questioning (p. 84). Instead of developing their own abilities, they have abandoned them; they have allowed themselves to become comfortable and safe with ‘a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, [and] a physician who decides my diet’ (p. 83). Kant likens this acceptance to a herd of domesticated cattle, made dumb, placid and timid; afraid of a danger made to appear serious by the ‘guardians’ who wanted to retain their control (p. 83), yet in reality was considerably less. In this ‘easy’ life, there was no real need for an individual to exert their own will or their own reason; the road to an easy life only required the money to pay for it (p. 83). However, in this ‘easy’ life, there would be no way to ‘extend knowledge,[or] purify […] errors’ (p. 87), a condition which, according to Kant, would be a ‘crime against human nature’ (p. 87).

Kant did not impose a definition or rules for correct reason; this is viewed as an avoidance strategy; he did not want to provide a new ‘authority’ for society to follow, to inculate himself as another guardian. Instead, he was focused on encouraging the proper way to use our ‘natural gifts’ because true reform could not come from a ‘revolution’ (p. 84). Enlightenment must therefore proceed gradually because revolution merely replaced ‘old prejudices with ‘new prejudices’. This is why a single individual may not be extricated from dependence on their ‘benevolent guardians’ through this process, but the wider society could become more enlightened (p. 84).

Turning to Kant’s distinction between public and private reason, it is important to avoid being misled by these terms; ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ are used in specific ways. For Kant, ‘Public’ reasoning was used to highlight the open and inclusive nature of the reasoning process, the wide social network it was publicised to, and also necessity for the individual to be speaking in their ‘own voice’ (p. 86). Conversely, ‘private’ reasoning was closed and exclusive, in some ways limited in its publication, and was carried out as a subject to the will of another (p. 86). What is clearly seen here is a demarcation between the ‘modes’ or ‘roles’ which an individual has. In an Enlightened age, every individual will use both of these forms of reasoning dependent on their circumstances.

An individual using the ‘public’ form of reason stepped into the role of a scholar disassociated from their socio‐political milieu. Regardless of rank, this individual could openly criticise, discuss, and consider alternatives to policies and matters with which they were concerned. A citizen in this role would be active, and use their courage to provide the public with ‘all of his carefully tested and well‐meaning thoughts’ (p. 86) about errors being made. Private use of reasoning, however, was markedly different. This kind of reason is used within the constraints of an organisation, where you have a specific function within that organisation. Only those in charge have the capacity to determine process, and criticism or discussion is highly limited. While in this ‘private’ mode, citizens can think ‘what [they] will, but obey!’ (p. 85).

A similar dichotomy occurs with the publicity aspect. When utilising ‘public’ reason, the necessity for a broad audience is highlighted. Kant specifically highlights this using terms such as a ‘readership’, and a ‘society of world citizens’, and ‘the reading public’ (p. 85). Public reasoning aims at reaching the widest possible audience, specifically to encourage diverse opinions. There is also a sense here that Kant implies the capacity for publicity for posterity, with the unacceptability of unceasingly binding a society (p. 87). To the contrary, private reasoning limits its reach to a specific group, for a specific duration, and only while those within the binding of the institution remain.

The final and most important dichotomy occurs in the degree of emancipation from higher authority. For an individual to use public reason, requires them to be speaking from their ‘own person’. Contrast this with the conformity required by individuals limited to private reason, required to carry ‘out the orders of another’ (p. 86). Consider this in light of one of Kant’s typical examples, modified for these purposes. There exists a tax collector, call her Ann. Ann, using her capacity for ‘public’ reason, submits articles to various journals highlighting her understanding of the inconsistencies and inequality in a newly implemented tax regime. However Ann, in her position as tax‐collector has no capacity for arguing; she must accept her duty passively and obey the law as it currently stands.

For Kant, this ability to reason and argue, whilst obeying, is the epitome of enlightened behaviour. Through the individual act of courage by ‘throwing off the yoke of tutelage’, and free use of public reason, courage in others would be stimulated (p. 84). Through this engagement with others, giving and receiving cognitive challenge and through reflection and response to alternate viewpoints, all parties, including those who remain on the outside of the interchange, are provided the opportunity to progress in their path toward enlightenment.

In order to create a mature, enlightened society, it was necessary to have the courage to use the ‘natural gifts’ (p. 84) within all, rather than relying on various authority figures to simply tell us what is right, healthy or true. This is characterised as a social process of Enlightenment; a continual progression towards freedom, a means, as well as the end for human nature (p. 87). it was essential that the use of ‘Public’ reason was completely free, as the right, indeed the duty of society was to progress toward enlightenment (Kant, p. 87). However, constraints on ‘Private’ reasoning could be implemented without blocking public enlightenment, since one acts as a passive actor, a ‘cog in the machine’ (p. 85); this temporary constraint would be offset by their ability to use public reason.

Bibliography

Kant, I. (1997) ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment 2^nd ed.,Trans. Lewis White Beck. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

1 Indications within the text suggest a gender-neutral reading is possible; this neutral reading could be challenged in conjunction with other work by Kant. This is a topic for a separate essay.

2 ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ reason used in this paper relate to Kant’s usage in Kant, I. (1997) ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment 2^nd ed.,Trans. Lewis White Beck. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.